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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Appellant, for the purpose of this Reply Brief, adopts the
Statement of Facts set forth in her original Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE APPELLANT, BONNIE BIRCH, HAS
CREDIBLE EVIDENCE AND BY DOING
THAT THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT
FINDINGS OF FACT ON THE ISSUE OF
AND THE CONCLUSIONS MADE BY THE

MARSHALED THE
SO HAS SHOWN
SUPPORT THE
INCOMPETENCY,
COURT ARE NOT

2
SUPPORTED BY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE OR TESTIMONY
AND THE COURT HAS FAILED TO APPLY THE
APPROPRIATE RULE OF LAW TO THE FACTS.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT UNDER THE FACTS
AND CIRCUMSTANCES ELICITED IN THE TRIAL OF THE
CASE IN RULING THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF
REQUIRED TO SUSTAIN A FINDING OF UNDUE
INFLUENCE REQUIRED CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT HAS ADEQUATELY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
RELATIVE TO THE FINDINGS OF FACT WHICH
ULTIMATELY PERTAIN TO THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF
INCOMPETENCY OF DECEDENT, AS FOUND AND
DECREED BY THE TRIAL COURT

The Respondent, in his Reply Brief, has alleged that the
Appellant has failed to adequately marshal the evidence in support
of her position on appeal. Findings of Fact numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 10, as challenged by the Appellant, present a challenge in
marshalling the evidence with delicate and precise delineation due
to the fact that many aspects of the same testimony and evidence
could arguably support or refute the findings of fact under attack.
It is because of this realization the Appellant canvassed the
entire record, and has described for this Court the evidence and
testimony which we consider to be of significant, credible and
probative value, and respectfully submit that there is contained
within the Appellant's Brief, a complete and detailed documentation
of the record as we view the same to have application to those
findings challenged by Appellant.
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It would be presumptuous for the Appellant to contend that
there is but one single version of the facts, evidence and
testimony applicable to a particular finding of the Trial Court, as
the total evidence and testimony is so intermingled that the same
is susceptible of various interpretations.

It is for this reason

we believe that this Court should consider the totality of the
evidence and testimony cited and then lend its direction and
guidance in rejecting or confirming the validity of same as applied
to the issues raised.

The evidence and testimony cited in the

"Statement of Facts" and "Argument" of Appellant's Brief, have been
marshaled

to

focus

upon

that

which

is

believed

to

be

of

significant, credible and probative value. Counsel for Respondent
may have followed a different format; however, we believe the
responsibility of bringing before this Court the evidence and
testimony which have a bearing on the critical issues has been
complied with.
Findings of Fact numbers 3 and 4 present difficulty in showing
that they are without adeguate support, without considering almost
each and every aspect of the record.

To say that the trial judge

could not reasonably believe or disbelieve a particular witness or
reconcile the testimonies of the different witnesses is of such a
nebulous nature that arguably the entire record would be at issue
on these findings.

Throughout the Appellant's Brief we have

attempted to cite the evidence and testimony which would bear upon
these two findings of fact, and concede that it presents a close
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call to challenge the same.
The challenge to Finding of Fact number 10 is primarily
directed to that portion which finds the Will of February 1, 1977
to be "the last Will and Testament" of the Decedent, which is more
in the nature of a Conclusion of Law than a Finding of Fact and is
challenged on that basis only.
Findings of Fact numbers 5, 6 and 7 are of such gravity that
the primary focus has been on these three issues in Appellant's
Brief.
To conclude that there has been no marshaling of the evidence
on Finding of Fact number 5 presupposes that credible evidence in
support of such fact exists. We have cited throughout Appellant's
Brief the credible evidence and testimony relating to this finding,
and respectfully submit that without engaging in speculation and
conjecture no credible evidence can be cited in support of such a
finding. Notwithstanding, we have invited the Court's attention to
the various testimonies and evidence elicited on the issue and
whether or not those portions marshaled and cited support or
disavow such a finding is the ultimate guestion before this Court.
The testimonies and evidence pertaining to Finding of Fact
number 6 have been marshaled and cited throughout the Appellant's
Brief in both the facts and the argument. As with Finding of Fact
number 5, much of the same testimony and evidence cited is
susceptible of different interpretations, and for that reason
cannot be categorized as standing for a specific side of the issue.
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The totality of the evidence and testimony, however, we respectably
submit dictates that the trial court erred and that the marshaling
of the evidence requirement has been complied with.
As noted in Appellant's original brief Id at 28, Finding of
Fact number 7 appears to be more in the nature of a Conclusion of
Law than a Finding of Fact, or a mixed Finding of Fact and
Conclusion of Law, and the genesis of such finding finds its roots
in the same testimony and evidence involved in Findings of Fact
numbers 5 and 6.
Should this Court conclude that the findings of the trial
court on the issue of incompetency, as primarily reflected by
Findings of Fact numbers 5, 6 and 7, are incorrect or that the
Trial Court misapplied the law to the facts, the significance of
Findings

of

Fact number

3 and

4 are relegated

to

relative

insignificance.
POINT II
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BURDEN
OF PROOF TO SHOW UNDUE INFLUENCE IN THE INSTANT
CASE REQUIRED CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE,
WAS CORRECT
Conclusion of Law number 7 (R 339) states:
"The burden of proof to establish that a Will
is void for undue influence is clear and
convincing evidence."
Respondent attempted to show that the wills of November 10,
1988 and/or November 15, 1988 were procured by undue influence on
the part of the Appellant.

In addressing and rejecting this
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contention the Court observed in its ruling from the bench as
follows:
"Undue influence, I think, is a little harder
matter. Because of my view that the standard
of proof is clear and convincing evidence and
I think this is a very difficult case because
of the testimony on both sides and I don't
think I can find by clear and convincing
evidence that he was under the influence of
undue influence, although probably if the
standard of proof were different, I'd come to
a different conclusion, but based upon the
fact that I find by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was not competent, either on
November 11th or November 15th, I find that
both of these wills are not valid, will not be
admitted to probate and consequently, the
earlier will of — whenever it w a s — * * *
February 1, 1977, will be admitted to probate"
(R 957, 958).
Counsel for respondent then queried the Court as follows:
MR. BENNETT: Thank you, your Honor. Do you also want me to
include a ruling on the confidential relationship issue?
THE COURT: I think not. I don't think it needs to be ruled
on, really. This case is disposed of on competency grounds, and I
think I decline to rule on the confidential relationship issue.
(Emphasis added) (R 958)
Although the Court signed and adopted the findings of fact
prepared by counsel for respondent, it is difficult to reconcile
finding of fact number 8 (R 338) with the ruling made from the
bench which made no mention of "preponderance of evidence" as it
pertains to undue influence (R 957, 958). Nevertheless, turning to
the direct issue raised in the cross-appeal, it is necessary to
review the status of the law on this issue as presently structured.
The law is unsettled with respect to the burden of proof

required in a will contest on the issue of undue influence.
On July 1, 1977, Utah adopted the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
Utah Code Annotated §75-8-101(1) 1978.
Utah Code Annotated §75-3-407, 1953 as amended provides in
part:
»* * * contestants of a Will have the burden
of establishing lack of testamentary intent or
capacity, undue influence, fraud, duress,
mistake, or revocation. * * *"
The case of Anderson v. Anderson, 43 U.26, 134 P. 553 is cited
in the annotations for authority on the issue of quantum of proof
in undue influence cases. A reading of the Anderson case does not
reveal a definitive answer except to note that the Utah Court
stated:
11

* * * no hard and fast rule can be laid down
which shall control in every case. Each case
must, to a very large extent, be determined
upon its own facts and circumstances, and in
arriving at a conclusion the foregoing general
rule should always be kept in mind."
The Court further noted that under the evidence in Anderson,
"It is the duty of the Courts to uphold the
Will."
The Utah Supreme Court, In Anderson, adopted the rule and
doctrine laid down in the case of In Re Higgins1 Estate, 156 Cal.
257, 104 P. 6 as follows:
"Undue Influence, however used, must, in order
to avoid a Will, destroy the free agency of
the testator at the time, and in the very act
of the making of the testament. It must bear
directly upon the testamentary act" Id 557

As noted in Koeslina v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah, 1975),
the burden of proof may shift during the trial, but the burden of
persuasion does not, and it is this burden which the contestant
(respondent) was required to meet in asserting undue influence.
In the case of In Re Bryan's Estate, 25 P. 2d 602 (Utah, 1933),
the Supreme Court of this state noted that:
"Undue Influence must be proved, it will not
be
presumed
from
mere
interest
or
opportunity." Id 610
The Court further cited with approval, the rule as stated in
40 Cyc. 1144 which in part holds:
ii* * * n o precise quantity of influence can be
said to be necessary and sufficient in all
cases, as the amount necessarily varies with
the circumstances of each case, and especially
does it vary accordingly as the strength or
weakness of mind of each testator varies, the
amount of influence necessary to dominate a
mind impaired by age, disease, or dissipation
being obviously less than that required to
control a strong mind." Id 610
The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of In Re Goldsberry's
Estate, 81 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1938) discussed the issue of undue
influence, and although not specifically delineating or addressing
the issue of quantum of proof, cited with approval the rule of law
in the case of In Re Sproston's Estate, Cal. App., 39 P. 2d 266,
affirmed 52 P.2d 924, as follows:
n* * * i n order to set aside a Will for undue
influence, there must be substantial proof of
pressure which overpowered the volition of the
testator at the time the Will was made." Id
1113

The

Utah

Supreme

Court, in Goldsberrvf s Estate f

supra,

referred to In Re Hanson's Will, 50 Utah 207, 167 P. 256 and noted
that "the evidence was directed almost entirely to the testators
sanity.

There was no evidence of undue influence."

Id 1113

The critical issue raised here was not specifically addressed
in Hanson and lends little help in clarifying the issue.
The case of In Re George's Estate 112 P.2d 498, (Utah 1941)
once again adopts the language of Goldsberry and uses the language
that

"substantial proof of a pressure which overpowered

the

volition of the testator at the time the Will was made" as the
reguisite proof.
Again in the case of In Re LaVelle's Estate, 248 P.2d 372
(Utah 1952) the Supreme Court held:
"To declare a Will invalid because of undue
influence, there must be an exhibition of more
than influence or suggestion, there must be
substantial proof of an overpowering of the
testator's volition at the time the will was
made, to the extent he is impelled to do that
which he would not have done had he been free
from such controlling influence, so that the
will represents the desire of the person
exercising the influence rather than that of
the testator. This showing need not be based
on proof of physical coercion or constraint."
Counsel for Respondent cites In Re Buttars' Estate, 261 P.2d
171 (Utah 1953) to support his claim that a "preponderance" of the
evidence is the guantum of proof reguired to prevail on the issue
of undue influence. We submit that a careful reading of this case
discloses that the Court is there talking about the burden of going
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forward and is not addressing the ultimate issue of "Burden of
persuasion".
Supra.

See Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975)

See also In Re Swan's Estate, 293 P.2d 682 (Utah 1952) Id

In
order
to
avoid
confusion
and
misunderstanding of the nature and effect of
presumptions, the distinctions between the
various
expressions
used
in
connection
therewith must be kept clearly in mind. For
instance
the
expressions
"burden
of
persuasion" and "burden of producing or going
forward with the evidence" differ in that the
former requires that the fact finder must be
convinced by the evidence that the existing
facts are in favor of the party who has such
burden in order to find the issue of facts on
that question in his favor, but the burden
described in the latter expression is of
temporary nature and is eliminated from the
case by a prima facie showing of facts on such
issue in favor of the party having such
burden.
Only a presumption which merely
shifts the burden of producing evidence is
eliminated or vanishes from the case upon a
prima facie showing to the contrary. * * *" Id
689
See also 57 Am.Jur., Wills, §386, Id 278.
The language in some of the cases cited above refer to the
quantum

of proof

"substantial".
P.2d

required

to show undue

influence

as being

The Utah Supreme Court in Greener v. Greener, 212

194, (Utah 1949), Justice Wolfe, writing for the Court,

stated:
"But for a matter to be clear and convincing
to a particular mind it must at least have
reached the point where there remains no
serious or substantial doubt as to the
correctness of the conclusion. A mind which
was of the opinion that it was convinced and
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yet which entertained, not a slight, but a
reasonable doubt as to the correctness of its
conclusion, would seem to be in a state of
confusion." (Emphasis added)
The meaning of the term "substantial" has been addressed by
the Supreme Court of New Mexico in the case of Lumpkins v. McPhee,
286 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1955).

On the issue of fraud, it held:

"The evidence in support of a finding of fraud
is not deemed substantial, if it is not clear,
strong and convincing. First National Bank v.
Lesser, supra; Shaw v. Board of Education,
supra; Frear v. Roberts, 51 N.M. 137, 179 P.2d
998; and where it is evenly balanced or barely
tips the scales in a party's favor, that is,
barely preponderates, it is not so supported.
When all the evidence is in, fraud being the
issue, or fraudulent intent to bring it down
to the present case, if the greatest effect it
has on the mind of the fact finder is to leave
it confronted by a question mark on the vital
issue, was there fraud?-then there is not that
type of evidence which alone is to be deemed
substantial and a finding of fraud cannot be
supported.
Undue influence has been characterized as a species of fraud.
Page on Wills §122; In Re Ricks1 Estate, 117 P. 539, (Cal. 1911) Id
545; In Re Newhall's Estate 214 P. 231 (Cal. 1923);
Utah has long recognized that the burden of proof (burden of
persuasion) in fraud cases requires clear and convincing evidence
to sustain such a charge.

Pace v. Parish, 247 P.2d 273, (Utah

1952); Shaw v. Abraham, 364 P.2d 7 (Utah 1961);
Although not Will contest cases, the Utah Supreme Court has
held that written contracts should be regarded with some degree of
sanctity and can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.
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See Otteson v. Malone, 584 P.2d

878 (Utah, 1978).

Resource

Management Company v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985)
Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 286 P.2d 1065.
Utah cases have recognized that clear and convincing evidence
is the quantum of proof required to successfully attack a deed upon
the grounds of undue influence.

Peterson v. Carter, 579 P.2d 329

(Utah 1978); Richmond v. Ballard, 325 P.2d

839

(Utah 1958);

Anderson v. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P.2d 142 (1945); O'Reilly v.
McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 P.2d 770 (1934).
In the Peterson case Supra, it was noted:
* * *the burden of showing undue influence in
the execution of the deed is even greater than
that of showing incompetence.
It must be
established by clear and convincing evidence
that the grantee exercised a dominating
influence over the grantor.
Undue

influence

reduced

to

its

simplest

terms

is

a

substitution of the Will of the grantee-devisee for that of the
grantor-testator. The logic and reasoning dictates that clear and
convincing evidence should be the standard of proof in an undue
influence case.
In the presentation of the present case, Judge Daniels,
viewing the evidence and testimony adduced in the trial, may well
have perceived that the matters urged by respondent as constituting
"undue influence" fell within the ambit of fraudulent or deceptive
conduct and in ruling as he did as to the quantum of proof required
on this issue, the appropriate rule of law was applied in requiring

13
that the proof of persuasion be that of clear and convincing
evidence, taking into account the "facts and circumstances" of the
case at hand.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In analyzing the issue of undue influence and the quantum of
proof necessary to sustain such a charge, the rulings and holdings
in other jurisdictions are, in our opinion, of significance.

It

has been noted in the case of In Re Draper's Estate, 374 P.2d 425
(Wyo. 1962) as follows:
"Clear proof of such influence is required in
order that a solemnly executed testament may
be set aside for undue influence.* * *" In Re
Andersonsfs Estate, 71 Wyo. 238, 255 P. 2d 983,
986.
»* * *wills deliberately made by persons of
sound mind are not to be lightly set aside,
and the undue influence which will warrant
doing so must be proven to be such as destroys
the free agency nd thereby substitutes the
will of another for that of the testator. * *
*" Cook v. Boldue, 24 Wyo. 281, 157 P. 580,
581, 582, 158 P. 266"
See also Frear v. Roberts, 179 P.2d 998 (N.M. 1947):
"Fraud cannot be presumed but must be proved
by clear and satisfactory evidence;"
First National Bank of Albuquerque v. Abraham, 639 P.2d 575 (N.M.
1982); Lumpkins v. McPhee, 286 P.2d 299 (N.M. 1955):
"Evidence in support of finding of fraud is
not deemed substantial if it is not clear,
strong and convincing, and where it is evenly
balanced or barely tips the scales in a
parties1 favor it is not so supported."
Substantial evidence:

Ankeny v. Grunstead, 551 P.2d 1027
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(Mont. 1976)
"Substantial evidence has been defined as such
evidence as will convince reasonable men and
on which such men may not reasonably differ as
to whether it establishes the Plaintiff's
case, and, if all reasonable men must conclude
that the evidence does not establish such
case, then it is not substantial evidence."
See also Sands v. Superior Buildings Co.. 349 P.2d

314

(Montana 1960),
"Substantial evidence" is a term that cannot
be defined definitely, and whether evidence in
a particular case amounts to substantiality is
a question of law on appeal which must be
determined from facts of each case as it
arises". Mississippi Public Service v. U.S.
D.C. Miss, 124 F. Supp. 809, 814
It is stated in 95 C.J.S. Wills §251 P. 1122 as follows:
According to some authorities, a preponderance
of the evidence is necessary and sufficient to
establish undue influence in the execution of
a will. However, in numerous cases, it has
been said that undue influence, invalidating a
will,
must
be
established
by
clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence by
compelling evidence, or by the manifest weight
of the evidence. In any event undue influence
in the execution of a will must be shown by
substantial evidence and evidence which merely
raises a suspicion or conjecture that the will
was the product of undue influence is
insufficient. . .(emphasis added)
In the case of Withers v. Withers, 363 Pa 431, 70 A. 2d 331
(1950) it was stated:
the quality and sufficiency of testimony
necessary to establish proof of undue
influence is the same whether relating to
wills or inter vivos documents.
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CONCLUSION
The prevailing rule indicates that each case involving the
issue of undue influence must be determined upon its own facts and
circumstances.

The evidence and testimony required to establish

undue influence may vary with the circumstances of each case,
considering all factors necessary to dominate the mind of the
testator at the time the Will was made.
In the instant case, the trial judge had before him the
testimony and evidence detailing the physical condition of the
testator and was obliged, under the prevailing law, to take into
account and consider all facts and circumstances necessary to carry
the burden of persuasion (burden of proof) on the critical issue.
Based upon the authorities cited above, we respectfully submit
that the trial judge made a correct pronouncement of the law under
the facts and circumstances involved.
Based upon the foregoing and the matters set forth and
contained in Appellant's prior brief, we respectfully submit that
the Trial Court's Findings, Conclusions and Judgment denying the
admission to probate of the Decedent's Will of November 10, 1988 or
November 15, 1988 are erroneous and contrary to law and/or the
Court has failed to apply the law to the facts, and the Judgment of
the Trial Court should be reversed by this Court.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

r/0

day of August, 1992.
y^>

ERRANT H. WALL
attorney for Appellant
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